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This paper examines the relationship between a differentiated downstream market and a specialized
upstream market.  We analyze four different types of vertical relation between the upstream and
downstream sectors when the upstream market supplies specialized and complementary inputs to a
downstream product differentiated market.  The first is the benchmark case of decentralized
markets, the second is a network of alliances among upstream suppliers, the third is partial vertical
integration and the fourth is an upstream consortium of suppliers.  We identify the perfect
equilibrium for a symmetric model in each case and show that there is no simple relationship
between the degree of connection between upstream and downstream firms and profitability.  The
key factor affecting prices and the relative profitability of the different market organizations is the
degree of product differentiation among the downstream firms because it affects the intensity of
competition among upstream suppliers.  We show that vertical foreclosure by the partially
integrated firms is not an equilibrium strategy.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: D40, L22.
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1.  Introduction
The Wall Street Journal has noted that “More and more of the work in America is project
oriented, with a beginning, a middle and an end.  Projects lend themselves to a blend of traditional
employees, contract workers and consultants, who combine into teams, do a job and then usually
break up, with most of the players looking for their next gig.”
2   The project-based approach to
doing business has long been practiced in the building trade and in Hollywood.   Today it is
spreading to a diverse set of downstream markets such as medical care, where general practitioners
and specialists combine into preferred provider groups to serve an HMO, and information services,
where alliances among high-tech upstream contractors are the norm.  Malone and Laubacher
(1998), for example, talk of projects undertaken by “e-lancers (who form) fluid and temporary
networks…When the job is done … the network disappears, and its members become independent
agents again … seeking the next assignment.” (1998, p. 146)
Concurrent with the spread of the project based approach, we also see many large
companies, such as Shell, Xerox, AMR Corporation and Scandinavian Airlines, spinning off their
information technology, training and consulting services into separate divisions.  The intent is to
market these specialized services to companies other than the parent company.   Again this is
common in Hollywood where, for example, the first television program developed by ABC and its
new studio Dreamworks was a show for CBS.
These changes in the upstream provision of specialized services share some common
underlying traits.  First, the upstream suppliers who come together to work on a project typically
supply specialized services that are complementary to each other.  Secondly, any one upstream
supplier could be working on more than one project at the same time.  Thirdly, when these
specialized input services are combined, they produce something that is itself differentiated.  These
traits suggest a connection between the differentiation of upstream services and the nature of
product differentiation downstream.  This in turn suggests that the demand for product
differentiation in the downstream market could be an important factor affecting the way that
specialized upstream services are supplied to the downstream.
                                               
2 Cited in “Flying Solo: High Tech Nomads Write New Program for Future of Work”, The Wall Street Journal, page
A1, August 19 1996.2
There is an extensive literature in industrial organization on product differentiation but it has
focused almost entirely on price and product competition in the downstream market alone.
3
Similarly there is an extensive literature on vertical relationships between upstream suppliers and
downstream firms
4 but the usual assumption is that the upstream firms supply perfect substitutes to
downstream firms who also produce perfect substitutes.
5  The connection between differentiation in
the upstream market and differentiation in the downstream market has received much less attention.
Yet one of the most important means by which downstream firms differentiate their products is
through the use of inputs that are differentiated or specialized.
This paper attempts to fill this gap and to explore how consumer attitudes to product
differentiation downstream affects vertical relations between the upstream and downstream.  We
develop a stylized model of an upstream sector that supplies specialized services to a product
differentiated downstream sector.  Our model captures several important features that are relevant
to the increasingly varied vertical relations that we currently observe.   Specifically, upstream
suppliers supply complementary specialized, or differentiated, inputs that are combined to produce
goods sold in a set of differentiated downstream markets.  Different combinations of these
complementary specialized inputs produce different downstream products. In addition, any one
upstream supplier may be working with more than one downstream firm at the same time.
We begin our analysis with the benchmark case of a fully decentralized organization of the
upstream and downstream markets.  For this case, the downstream producers buy their
differentiated and complementary inputs from independently owned and managed upstream
suppliers. The downstream firms produce their differentiated goods and compete in prices for
consumers of their products.
The equilibrium set of upstream and downstream prices for the decentralized case is
inefficient due to two well-known complementarities in production.  The first of these is the
pecuniary externality first noted by Cournot (1838), which here is relevant to the upstream supply
                                               
3 See Beath and Katsoulacos (1991) for a survey of the economic theory of product differentiation, and Thisse and
Norman (1995) for a collection of many of the most important papers.
4 Some of the notable contributions include Bolton and Whinston (1993), Bonanno and Vickers (1988), Gaudet and
Van Long (1996), Hart and Tirole (1990), Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) and Salinger (1988).
5 Exceptions are Bolton and Whinston (1993) who investigate the vertical relationship between an upstream firm
who supplies two downstream firms selling in completely differentiated markets and Bonanno and Vickers (1988)
who consider two firms which produce differentiated products that compete with each other.3
of two complementary inputs.
6  The second type of complementarity is similar to the first but,
because it reflects a coordination failure between the upstream and the downstream, is commonly
referred to as double marginalization.   The coordination failures in decentralized pricing lead to
higher prices and loss of potential profits in the upstream and/or downstream sectors.
We then investigate prices and profits under two alternative ways of transacting business
between the upstream and the downstream that partially internalize the pecuniary externalities
and/or remove the effects of double marginalization.
7   The first of these is the creation of a
horizontal network to facilitate alliances among upstream suppliers.  The second arrangement is
partial vertical integration in which some, but not all, downstream producers own their specialized
upstream suppliers.  For this case we must also consider how the integrated firm is internally
organized, or more specifically, the degree of separation between the downstream and upstream
divisions.   Bonanno and Vickers (1988) show that some form of vertical separation, which leads to
non-marginal cost pricing, may be desirable when it leads to softer downstream price competition.
We examine three different internal organizations of the integrated firm with varying degrees of
separation, one analogous to the U-form and two variations on the M-form.
In our analysis of these three upstream-downstream arrangements we assume that the
upstream firms (or divisions) set linear prices for their inputs. A familiar result in the literature on
vertical relations is that two-part pricing between independent firms can often capture the
advantages of vertical integration.  Why then do we focus on linear pricing?  There are two reasons
for doing so.  First, in the context of our model there is no generally accepted method of
determining the Nash equilibrium two-part prices since these are derived from an N-firm bargaining
game, where N is the total number of upstream and downstream firms.  Secondly, even if we
impose what might be argued to be a “reasonable” solution to this bargaining game, there is no
reason to believe that two-part pricing is more profitable for the upstream firms than linear pricing.
                                               
6  The pecuniary externalities associated with the decentralized production and trading of complementary goods
originally identified by Cournot (1838) are often called indirect network externalities.  Economides and Salop (1992)
analyze how indirect network externalities affect competition and integration among the producers of
complementary goods in a product network.  We also consider multiple producers of differentiated complementary
goods.  However, in contrast to Economides and Salop (1992), the differentiated complementary goods are
intermediate input goods demanded by downstream firms to produce a set of differentiated final products.
7 Our comparison of the different organizational structures is comparative static, in that we identify sufficient but not
necessary conditions under which particular organizational structures will emerge.  We leave to subsequent analysis
a full consideration of the endogenous determination of organizational structure.4
All of the analyses of non-linear pricing have the characteristic that a single upstream
monopolist supplies each downstream firm.  Moreover, almost all of the analyses make the further
assumption that the downstream firms have no bargaining power relative to the upstream firms:
usually by assuming that each downstream firm is selected by its upstream supplier from a large
group of potential firms who compete for the supply contract.  The two-part price is then simply
formulated.  Set the unit price to maximize downstream profits and use the franchise fee to extract
those profits.  Matters are not as simple if the downstream firms have bargaining power.  However,
since each firm is involved in only one supply relationship this can be treated essentially as a
separable set of two-person bargaining games, one for each upstream/downstream pair, with the
solution presumably being the Nash bargaining solution for each pair.
Much more complex considerations arise in our model.  To anticipate, we consider a
situation in which each of four downstream firms relies upon two upstream suppliers, each
upstream firm supplies two competing downstream firms and all firms have market power.  So with
two-part pricing we would have a three-person bargaining game for each downstream product and
each upstream firm would be bargaining with two downstream firms.  So far as we are aware, there
is no general solution to this type of eight-person bargaining game.
8  Moreover, the solutions that
have been proposed generally involve offers and counteroffers between all of the players, a concept
that runs into obvious anti-trust problems in our specific context where some of the players - the
downstream firms - are in direct competition with each other.
One potentially appealing approach, in that it at least avoids anti-trust complications, might
be that we should treat the bargaining game for each downstream product separately.  If this were
done then the Nash bargaining solution for each downstream product would have the two upstream
suppliers and their relevant downstream customer share the aggregate profits equally. As a result,
each upstream firm would set its unit price to maximize aggregate profit of the two downstream
firms it supplies.  But then we can show
9 that two-part pricing is more profitable than linear pricing
for the upstream firms only for “high” degrees of downstream product differentiation: levels of
product differentiation at which the upstream firms would prefer close integration of the upstream
                                               
8   As Mas-Colell et al. (1995) point out, the axiomatic approach underlying the Nash bargaining solution “does not
contemplate the possibility of situations intermediate between full cooperation of all agents and the complete
breakdown represented by the threat-point outcome.  Where there are more than two agents this is definitely
restrictive.” (1995, p. 846)  See also Sutton (1985).5
and downstream.
10  At lower degrees of product differentiation, for which it seems reasonable to
suppose that some type of arms-length relationships would be preferred, linear pricing would also
be preferred by the upstream firms.
The third and final vertical arrangement that we consider is a full consortium of the
upstream suppliers for which these bargaining complications disappear. In the consortium the
upstream suppliers act as if they are under common ownership and so are able to set a two-part
tariff and coordinate the prices charged to each downstream buyer.  The result is that the
consortium is able to extend its monopoly power into the downstream market.
A central finding of our paper is that the relative profitability of the different vertical
relationships between the upstream suppliers and the downstream producers depends critically upon
the degree of product differentiation in the downstream sector. Upstream suppliers and
downstream producers do not necessarily gain from having closer ties between them because the
degree of downstream product differentiation affects the intensity of upstream competition. As a
result, organizational structures that strengthen the ties between the upstream and downstream
firms have conflicting effects.  On the one hand, they weaken the profit-reducing complementarities
to which we have referred but on the other, they make the upstream firms more directly subject to
downstream competition.  The relative strength of these two effects is determined by the degree of
downstream product differentiation.
Another important finding is that under partial vertical integration, vertical foreclosure of
the non-integrated downstream rivals is never an equilibrium strategy.  This result stands in contrast
with the analysis of Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990).  The difference is that in our model the exit
of the foreclosed downstream firms would so intensify price competition in the downstream market
that foreclosure is not a profitable strategy for the integrated firms to pursue.
In the next section we describe our stylized model of upstream and downstream production.
The next four sections analyze the different ways in which competition is structured between the
upstream and downstream markets. The relative effects of these market structures on prices and
profits are detailed in Section 7.  Section 8 presents our summary and conclusions.
2.   THE MODEL
                                                                                                                                                         
9  Details can be obtained from the authors on request.6
We assume that the upstream market contains two upstream suppliers each supplying a
differentiated or specialized input j = 1, 2 and two upstream suppliers each supplying a
differentiated input k = 1¢, 2¢.  The two inputs are compatible with each other and the marginal cost
of each specialized input is assumed to be constant and equal, implying that these costs can be
normalized to zero.  The unit prices of the inputs are denoted vj and vk, j ˛ {1, 2}, k ˛ {1¢, 2¢} and
we denote the vector of unit input prices by v = (v1, v2, v1¢, v2¢).
Each downstream firm produces at most one differentiated product using a (Leontief)
constant returns to scale, fixed proportions production technology.  Product differentiation arises
because each downstream firm uses a different combination of the two upstream inputs j and k.
Specifically, there are four differentiated downstream goods of type (j; k) = (1;1¢), (1;2¢), (2;1¢) and
(2;2¢).   They are produced in quantities q = (q(1;1¢), q(1;2¢), q(2;1¢), q(2;2¢)) and sold in the downstream
market at prices p = (p(1;1¢), p(1;2¢), p(2;1¢), p(2;2¢)). We can refer interchangeably to downstream
product (j; k) and downstream firm (j; k).  Figure 1 illustrates this market structure.
(Figure 1 near here)
The constant-marginal-cost and fixed-proportions-technology assumptions characterize
much of the literature investigating the relationship between the upstream and downstream sectors.
Suppose now that demand for downstream product (j; k) is given by q(j;k)(p).  We can show (see
the Appendix) that, provided q(j;k)(p) satisfies standard convexity properties and that ￿q(j;k)(p) < 0,
so that the downstream products are substitutes, any arrangement that reduces the input prices v
also reduces downstream product prices p and so benefits consumers.
Our focus, however, is not just on the price effects of different upstream-downstream
arrangements but also on their impacts on profits.  As a result, in the interests of analytical
tractability we need to sacrifice some generality by introducing additional structure to the model.
Specifically, we follow Shubik (1980) and Deneckere and Davidson (1985) by assuming that the
demand for differentiated good (j; k) in the downstream market is linear and given by:
11
                                                                                                                                                         
10  Gal-Or (1992) obtains a similar result in a much simpler setting where the determination of the two-part tariff is
not subject to the bargaining problems that apply in our analysis.
11 It is worth noting that since our particular interest is in local neighborhoods where one upstream-downstream
arrangement becomes more profitable than another, the linearity assumption can be viewed as a local linear
approximation to a non-linear system.7
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The parameter g measures the degree of product differentiation, or substitution, among the
four products in the downstream market.  As g increases the products become more differentiated
in consumption.  When g ﬁ ¥ the products are completely differentiated.  In this case, each firm in
the downstream is a single-product monopolist.   In contrast, when g ﬁ 0 the downstream products
are perfect substitutes in consumption. A major advantage of our simplifying assumptions is that
the relative merits of the different vertical relationships between the upstream and the downstream
can be assessed purely in terms of the parameter g.
Price competition occurs in two stages.  The upstream suppliers set input prices v in the
first stage.  In the second stage, downstream firms, facing these input prices, produce differentiated
products and compete in prices p for their consumers.  We solve for the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium to this two-stage price game for each of the market structures.
3.   THE BENCHMARK CASE OF DECENTRALIZED PRICING
The first case we consider is the benchmark case of decentralized price setting.  In this case
the problem facing a downstream firm (j; k) in the second stage subgame is to choose the profit-
maximizing price 
*
) ; ( k j p  for its product given the prices it faces for its upstream inputs.  The
solution to this problem can be written as:
(2) ( )( ) { } k j k j k j k j v v p q p - - =
*
) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( max arg p (j = 1,2; k = 1¢, 2¢)
This leads to a best response function in prices from which the set of equilibrium downstream
prices in the stage two subgame can be found.  The equilibrium prices  ( ) ( ) { } v v p
* * = ) ; ( k j p  are detailed
in the Appendix.
Given the set of equilibrium prices p*(v) from the second stage subgame, an upstream firm j
determines the derived demand function  ( ) v
*
j x  that it faces in the first stage of the game. Similarly
an upstream firm k derives its input demand function  ( ) v
*
k x . Note that each upstream firm supplies
two downstream firms with its specialized input. As a result, the derived demands facing each
upstream supplier are:8
(3)
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(j = 1,2; k = 1¢, 2¢)
In the first stage of the game the upstream firms independently choose their input prices to
maximize profits defined as
12:
(4) ( ) v
* = P u u
d
u x v ( } 2 , 1 , 2 , 1 { ¢ ¢ ˛ u )
The input price reaction functions (see Appendix) indicate that prices of complementary inputs are
strategic substitutes while the prices of competing inputs are strategic complements.
Solving the first-order conditions from (4) gives the Nash equilibrium input prices, which in
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Substituting (5) into the reaction functions for output prices gives the downstream Nash
equilibrium prices:
(6)  ( )
( )( ) 3 46 48 3 8
12 49 40 8
2
2
) ; ( + g + g + g
+ g + g g
=
*d
k j p (j = 1,2; k = 1¢, 2¢)
As we would expect,  0 > ¶g ¶
*d
u v  and  0 ) ; ( > ¶g ¶
*d
k j p .  The Nash equilibrium input and output
prices are both increasing functions of the degree of product differentiation in the downstream
market.  As g ﬁ 0, consumers view the products in the downstream market as being less
differentiated.  Accordingly, decreases in g mean that downstream price competition becomes
tougher with the result that the equilibrium input price  0 ﬁ
*d
u v , or goes to marginal cost.
13  By
contrast, as g ﬁ ¥ consumers view the downstream products as being increasingly differentiated.
Price competition in the downstream becomes softer.  As a result the equilibrium input prices
3 1 ﬁ
*d
u v  and the equilibrium output prices  6 5 ) ; ( ﬁ
*d
k j p .
The impact of increased product differentiation on upstream and downstream profits is less
clear-cut as can be seen from Figure 2.  On the one hand, softer price competition in the
                                               
12 The superscript ‘d’ refers to the decentralized case.
13 It is easily shown that the elasticity of upstream and downstream prices with respect to g is unity when g = 0 and
tends to zero as g increases.  Thus, even a small degree of product differentiation is sufficient to generate a sharp
increase in equilibrium downstream prices.9
downstream has a favorable effect upon both upstream and downstream profits.  On the other hand,
the coordination failures that result from noncooperative pricing also become greater the larger is g
and adversely affect profitability in both the upstream and downstream.  For upstream suppliers the
profit-reducing effect of the coordination failures is more than offset by the profit-increasing effect
of increased product differentiation for g < 0.219.  However, as g increases beyond this limit and
the downstream becomes more differentiated, the coordination failure dominates, and the profits of
the upstream firms fall.  The threshold for the downstream sector is even lower.  For g > 0.121 the
profits of the downstream firms fall as the parameter g increases.
The upstream firms are always more profitable than the downstream firms because of the
monopoly power they enjoy. The difference in profits between the upstream and downstream is
greatest when g is relatively small (equal to 0.112).  In the limit as g ﬁ ¥ we have that





(Figure 2 near here)
4.   AN UPSTREAM NETWORK OF SUPPLIER ALLIANCES
The coordination failures associated with the decentralized benchmark provide both
upstream suppliers and downstream firms with an incentive to find other ways of transacting
business.  An alliance is one way that two upstream suppliers can coordinate upon the pricing of
their complementary services.  An upstream supplier network of alliances is a structure that
facilitates the formation of multiple alliances among the complementary upstream suppliers.
14
When two suppliers create an alliance to work together on producing a specialized input package
for a downstream client, they can, at the same time, work in alliance with other upstream partners
to produce different specialized input packages for different downstream customers.  We illustrate
in Figure 3(a) the alliances to which upstream firm 1 belongs and in Figure 3(b) the alliances to
which upstream firm 1¢ belongs.
(Figure 3 near here)
It should be emphasized that the network of upstream alliances does not eliminate
competition since each of the various upstream alliances supplies different downstream firms that
are in competition with each other.
                                               
14   Note that we consider only alliances between complementary upstream firms i.e. between a j firm and a k firm.10
Consider how alliances among complementary upstream suppliers affect the perfect Nash
equilibrium set of prices.  In stage two of the game downstream firms, facing the input prices v, buy
their inputs and compete in price for customers in the downstream market.  Hence, the stage two
subgame is the same as in the decentralized case [see equation (2)].  However the network of
alliances affects stage one since the upstream suppliers are now able to coordinate the pricing of the
specialized package of inputs (j; k) demanded by their downstream client.  The aggregate profit of
an alliance between j and k is:
(7) ( ) ( ) ( ) v p* ) ; ( ) ; ( k j k j
a
k j q v v + = p (j = 1,2; k = 1¢, 2¢)
We assume that the upstream suppliers share this profit equally—the Nash bargaining solution for
this symmetric game between the upstream members of the alliance.
As we have noted, in belonging to a network of alliances, an upstream supplier j is in
separate alliances with both of the upstream suppliers k.  Hence, the maximization problem facing
upstream supplier j is to choose an input price vj to maximize its overall return from being a
member of its part of the network of alliances.  That is, in stage one, the supplier j chooses its input
price vj to maximize:
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The maximization problems facing the upstream suppliers k are similarly defined.  The joint solution
to these maximization problems yields the input prices for stage one of the game.
As before, the reaction functions for the network alliance are such that the prices of
complementary inputs are strategic substitutes while the prices of competing inputs are strategic
complements.  Simultaneously solving the reaction functions gives the supplier network Nash
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Substituting in the reaction functions for output prices gives the Nash equilibrium output prices:
(10)  ( )
( )( ) 3 32 32 3 8
27 116 96 2
2
2
) ; ( + g + g + g
+ g + g g
=
*n
k j p (j = 1,2; k = 1¢, 2¢)11
Comparison with (5) confirms that for all values of the parameter g the upstream supplier
network leads to lower equilibrium input prices and therefore lower equilibrium product prices than
does the decentralized benchmark.
15  The network of upstream alliances at least partially removes
the coordination failures between upstream suppliers.  Note also that 0 > ¶g ¶
*n
u v  and  0 ) ; ( > ¶g ¶
*n
k j p .
The Nash equilibrium input and output prices are both increasing functions of the degree of product




u p v , just as in the decentralized
case.  By contrast, as g ﬁ ¥, the equilibrium input prices  4 1 ﬁ
*n
u v  and the equilibrium output
prices  4 3 ) ; ( ﬁ
*n
k j p .
16
As downstream product differentiation increases, the profits of the upstream suppliers and
the downstream producers are again affected by the trade-off between softer downstream price
competition and coordination failures as can be seen in Figure 4.  However, the critical value of g at
which the loss of profit from double marginalization is just offset by the profit increasing effect of
softer price competition, is higher than in the decentralized case.  The value is g = 0.24 for the
upstream suppliers and g = 0.55 for the downstream producers.
(Figure 4 near here)
5.   PARTIAL VERTICAL INTEGRATION
We now consider an alternative way to transact business that is based on vertical
integration.  Because not all of the downstream firms can integrate upstream (for example, if
downstream firm (1;1¢) integrates with its two upstream suppliers, then firm (2;1¢) cannot do the
same) we consider a partial framework in which some firms are vertically integrated and others are
not.  Specifically, we let downstream firms (1;1¢) and (2;2¢) integrate with their upstream suppliers
to form the integrated firms [1;1¢] and [2;2¢] whereas the downstream firms (1;2¢) and (2;1¢) remain
non-integrated.  Figure 5 illustrates the partially vertically integrated structure.
(Figure 5 near here)
We initially assume that there is no strategic attempt at vertical foreclosure.  That is, we
assume that the upstream divisions of the integrated firms supply their services to the non-
                                               
15  We show in the Appendix that this is also the case for more general demand specifications.
16  Given our demand system, these are just the prices that would be charged by a monopoly producer of a composite
upstream input and a downstream monopolist.12
integrated downstream firms.  Downstream firm (1;2¢) buys input 1 from [1;1¢] at price v1, and
input 2¢ from [2;2¢] at price v2¢.  Downstream firm (2;1¢) buys input 2 from [1;1¢] at price v1 and
input 1¢ from [1;1¢] at price v1¢.
17  We address the possibility of foreclosure below.
Bonanno and Vickers (1988) show that when downstream firms compete in price for
consumers a degree of vertical separation between the upstream and downstream softens price
competition and can lead to higher profit.  This suggests that marginal cost pricing of the upstream
division’s services may not necessarily maximize the integrated firm’s profit.  Accordingly, we
consider three different internal organizations of the vertically integrated firms:
(i) Centralized integration in which the upstream division has no pricing autonomy and supplies
its services to the downstream division at marginal cost.
(ii) Divisional integration in which the upstream unit is established as a separate division and
profit center and sets the prices of its services to maximize its divisional profits.
(iii) Divisional integration in which the upstream unit is established as a separate division and
profit center but prices are set to maximize the integrated firm’s profits.
For each of the three internal organizations of the integrated firm, we again proceed with a
two-stage game.  Now, however, the first stage of the game is one in which there are six input
prices.  First there are the prices vj and vk at which the upstream units sells their specialized input
goods j and k to non-integrated downstream firms.  Then there are the input prices v(i;i¢) (i = 1, 2)
for the combined input packages that are sold internally to the downstream divisions.  In the second
stage, both the integrated and non-integrated firms choose their downstream product prices 
*
) ; ( k j p .
Unlike our two previous cases, the partially vertically integrated market case introduces an
important asymmetry in the equilibrium prices for products sold in the downstream market.
We begin by looking at the pricing problem facing the integrated and non-integrated
downstream firms in stage two of the game.  In this stage, the downstream firms choose prices to
satisfy the conditions:
(11a) ( )( ) { } ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( max arg i i i i i i i i v p q p ¢ ¢ ¢
*
¢ - = p (i = 1,2)
                                               
17 Upstream alliances and nonlinear pricing can replicate the Nash equilibrium for the partial vertical integration
case.   This will happen if the upstream supplier 1 forms an alliance solely with upstream supplier 1¢ and upstream
supplier 2 forms an alliance solely with upstream supplier 2¢; and if each of these alliances apply two-part pricing to
their captive downstream customer, firm (1;1¢) or (2;2¢), while supplying its other downstream buyer at a linear
price. The distribution of profits may differ, however.13
(11b) ( )( ) { } h i h i h i h i v v p q p ¢ ¢ ¢
*
¢ - - = ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( max arg p (i, h = 1,2; i „ h)
Each firm's solution to its maximization problem yields a best response function in prices from
which the equilibrium downstream prices  ( ) ( ) { } v v p
* * = ) ; ( k j p  can be found, where now v = (v(1;1¢),
v(2;2¢), v1, v2,  v1¢, v2¢).  These equilibrium prices are derived in the Appendix.
We now turn to characterizing the complete, stage one and stage two Nash equilibria for
each of the three different ways vertically integrated firms could be organized.  Thereafter, we
compare the prices and profits that these equilibria generate for all the firms.
18
5.1 CENTRALIZED  INTEGRATION
With this organization of an integrated firm we have v(i;i¢) = 0 (i = 1, 2), so that in the first
stage of the game the integrated firm [i; i¢] chooses input prices vi and vi¢ to maximize profit:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) v p v p v p v * * * ; ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( i h i h i i i i i i
Ic
i i q v q v q p ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢
*
¢ ¢ + + = P       (i, h = 1,2; i „. h).
Solving the resulting reaction functions gives the equilibrium prices for the traded inputs
under centralized integration:
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Substituting (12) into the reaction functions for output prices yields the following Nash equilibrium
prices which hold for g > 0.0297:
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For g < 0.0297 downstream price competition is very tough and the prices set for the inputs
sold externally to the non-integrated downstream firms are such that the non-integrated firms
cannot sell positive quantities at the Nash equilibrium downstream prices. They exit from the
market. We refer to this as non-predatory vertical foreclosure since it arises as a natural
consequence of Nash equilibrium pricing on the part of the upstream units of the integrated firms
                                               
18 The intriguing but complicated question remains as to which organizational form is most likely to emerge.  We
hope to pursue this question in subsequent analysis.14
rather than from a deliberate attempt by these firms to foreclose by refusing to supply the
independent downstream firms.
Eliminating firms (1;2¢) and (2;1¢), deriving and solving the reaction functions for firms










i i p   for g < 0.0297
Comparison of (13a) and (13c) indicates that the exit of the high-cost downstream firms
further toughens price competition in the downstream market, reducing prices and profitability of
the two remaining integrated firms.
It is easy to show that  0 > ¶g ¶
*
•
cp v  and  0 > ¶g ¶
*
•
cp p  for both the upstream divisions and
their downstream clients.  Once again, the Nash equilibrium input and product prices are increasing
functions of the degree of product differentiation in the downstream market.  Because the
integrated firms acquire their specialized input package at marginal cost equal to zero, whereas the
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5.2     AN UPSTREAM PROFIT MAXIMIZING  DIVISION
Under this organizational form the integrated firm establishes the upstream unit as a divisional
profit center, charged with the goal of maximizing its own profit. This implies that in the first stage
of the game the input prices v(i;i¢), vj and vk are set to maximize profit:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) v p v p v p * * * ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( i h i h i i i i i i
Id
i i q v q v q v ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ + + = P       (i, h = 1,2; i „ h).
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) ; ( + < ¢ , indicating that the upstream division of each integrated firm
discriminates against its non-integrated downstream buyers.  Moreover, the upstream division will
never adopt marginal cost pricing internally when g  > 0, and as g ﬁ ¥, the price of the internal
package of services  2 1
*
) ; ( ﬁ ¢
dp





j v v .  These15
make sense. When g is small, competition in the downstream market is fierce, constraining the
price-setting power of an upstream division.  As g rises, the upstream profit center behaves
increasingly like an upstream monopolist with respect to its captive downstream customers.
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In this case, the downstream prices are such that the non-integrated firms sell a positive amount no
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input cost advantage enjoyed by the downstream units translates into lower downstream prices. As
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5.3    AN UPSTREAM PROFIT CENTER MAXIMIZING GROUP PROFIT
For this internal organization, we assume that, although the upstream division of an
integrated firm is established as a profit center, it is allocated a profit share determined by the
profitability of the integrated firm [i;i¢].  This means that the input prices v(i;i¢), vj and vk are set to
maximize the integrated firm’s profit:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) v p v p v p v * * * ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( i i i h i i i i i i
Ig
i i q v q v q p ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢
*
¢ ¢ + + = P      (i, h = 1,2; i „ h).
We again derive the Nash equilibrium prices from simultaneous solution of the implied
reaction functions.  These are:
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This form of divisionalization also leads to price discrimination against the non-integrated
downstream buyers.  However, in contrast with the previous cases, we find that now there is a non-
monotonic relationship between the internal input price and the degree of product differentiation.
The internal input price initially increases with g, but then as g ﬁ ¥ , 0
*
) ; ( ﬁ ¢
gp
i i v .  In other words,
when the upstream unit sets prices to maximize the integrated firm’s profit rather than its own16
divisional profit, a high degree of product differentiation in the downstream market will lead it to
set its internal price “close” to marginal cost.  It should be emphasized, however, that it is only
when the downstream firms are effectively monopolists that this form of vertical integration leads
to marginal cost pricing of the internally supplied input services.  When there is competition in the
downstream market, it is desirable for the integrated firm to have some degree of vertical
separation between its upstream and downstream divisions, even though this separation introduces
double marginalization between them.
19
Substituting (16) into the downstream reaction functions gives the equilibrium prices:
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As in the centralized form of integration, there is a degree of product differentiation, in this
case g = 0.0175, below which the non-integrated downstream firms choose to exit the market. In
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5.4    RELATIVE PRICES AND PROFITABILITY WITH PARTIAL VERTICAL INTEGRATION
Input and product prices under the three different organizational forms of partial vertical
integration are illustrated in Figure 6 and point to a simple relationship.  Centralized integration
gives the lowest prices, whereas the divisional form in which the upstream unit is motivated only by
its own profit gives the highest prices.  The intuition behind this outcome is straightforward.
Supplying the specialized input package internally at marginal cost toughens price competition in
                                               
19A model of two-part pricing between non-integrated firms gives the same result that the unit price of the input
should be set to marginal cost only if the downstream market is monopolized. In any other situation (other than g =
0) the unit price should exceed marginal cost.17
the downstream market, and so constrains the prices of upstream services that can be charged to
the non-integrated downstream firms.  By contrast, when an upstream division is concerned purely
with its own profits, the division has the incentive to maintain a higher internal price for its services,
which in turn allows it to charge higher external prices for its services.  The monopoly power of the
autonomous upstream division is, of course, still constrained by competition in the downstream
market.
(Figure 6 near here)
Not surprisingly, the profit of a non-integrated downstream firm increases with the degree
of product differentiation in the downstream market (see Figure 7(a)).  The internal organization of
the integrated firm also affects a non-integrated firm’s profitability. Centralized integration gives the
lowest profit to the non-integrated downstream firms and the divisional form in which the upstream
unit is motivated only by its own profit gives the non-integrated firms the highest profit.  This
ranking reflects a trade-off between two forces.  On the one hand, an internal organizational form
that leads to lower external input prices benefits the non-integrated firms by reducing their costs.
On the other hand, the corresponding lower internal input prices adversely affect the non-
integrated firms by making them less price competitive with their integrated competitors.  What is
quite clear from Figure 7(a) is that the detrimental price competitive effect more than offsets the
beneficial cost effect.
(Figure 7 near here)
No such simple relationship characterizes the profitability of an integrated firm, as can be
seen from Figure 7(b).  As g increases, the integrated firm’s profit is affected by the trade-off
between softer downstream price competition and the coordination failures that remain with partial
vertical integration. Of much more interest, however, is the result that the relative profitability of
the different ways of internally organizing the integrated firm also varies with the degree of product
differentiation.  With the exception of the polar cases where g = 0 or g = ¥, centralized integration,
or the traditional U-form, is always less profitable than divisional integration in which the upstream
division’s concern is with group profits. It is true that divisional integration reintroduces the
efficiency losses associated with double marginalization.  However, setting a higher internal input
price softens price competition among the integrated firms and therefore increases the external18
input price that can be charged to non-integrated firms.  The gain from softening downstream
competition more than offsets the efficiency loss of double marginalization.
Yet divisional integration in which the upstream unit is concerned with group profits is not
always more profitable than divisional integration in which the upstream unit is a profit center
concerned solely with its own profit.  Specifically, if the degree of product differentiation in the
downstream market is less than g = 0.459, the integrated firm earns greater aggregate profits if the
upstream division sets prices to maximize the upstream division’s own profit.  In short, a divisional
structure is preferable to a centralized one, but the form of divisionalization  “matters”.
The intuition behind this initially surprising result lies in issues that we have already
discussed.  If an integrated firm establishes its upstream division as a divisional profit center it
reintroduces all of the efficiency losses associated with double marginalization.  However, such a
structure insulates the upstream unit from downstream price competition much more effectively
than if the upstream division aims to maximize group profits.  When the degree of downstream
product differentiation is low it is more profitable to adopt the structure that softens downstream
price competition than the structure that increases pricing efficiency.
5.5    VERTICAL FORECLOSURE
We have already noted that when the degree of downstream differentiation is low, it is
possible that the non-integrated rivals are not able to survive at the Nash equilibrium prices at
which integrated firms sell their upstream services.  This occurs when g  < 0.029 in the case of the
centralized U form of integration, and when g < 0.0175 in the case of organizing the upstream unit
as a profit center maximizing the integrated firm’s profit.  Exit of the non-integrated firms in such
cases is the outcome of equilibrium behavior, and cannot be considered to be predatory.
We now consider whether it is in the interests of an integrated firm deliberately to foreclose
on one or both of the nonintegrated downstream firms.  This type of foreclosure is a predatory act
that is taken by an integrated firm to drive a non-integrated downstream firm from the market.  For
example, since there is no other supplier of upstream product 1, the refusal by firm [1;1¢] to supply
downstream firm (1;2¢) is a predatory act because it forces firm (1;2¢) to exit the market.19
Consideration of all possible downstream configurations that such foreclosure might generate yields
the pay-off matrix of Table 1.
20
Each of the strategy combinations on the main diagonal of Table 1 constitutes a Nash
equilibrium.  Note, however, that “no foreclosure” is a weakly dominant strategy for both partially
vertically integrated firms.  These firms never have an incentive to cut off downstream rivals from
the necessary inputs because such a predatory action intensifies competition between the integrated
firms.   Rather, the integrated firms have an incentive to keep the non-integrated, high-cost
downstream firms in operation in order to soften downstream price competition.
(Table 1 near here)
6. AN UPSTREAM CONSORTIUM
The final vertical arrangement that we consider is one in which the upstream suppliers are
able fully to coordinate their prices by forming an upstream consortium. For example, professional
organizations in the health sector could form such a consortium. The advantage of the consortium
is that it eliminates the inefficiencies that characterize the other cases. Now the upstream suppliers
are able to implement a two-part tariff of the form T(j;k) + v(j;k)q(j;k), where v(j;k) is the unit price
charged for the combined input package (j; k) used by downstream firm (j; k).
Given the symmetry of our model, we know that the upstream consortium will charge the
same unit price v for the combined input package to each of the downstream firms.  In the second
stage price game the downstream firms choose the profit-maximizing prices 
*
) ; ( k j p  for their
products sold in the downstream market.  These prices satisfy:
(20) ( )( ) { } v p q p k j k j k j - =
*
) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( max arg p (j = 1,2; k = 1¢, 2¢)
Again, the equilibrium prices  ( ) ( ) { } v p v k j
* = ) ; ( * p  are detailed in the Appendix.  In the first stage, the
upstream consortium sets v to maximize aggregate downstream profits because this permits
setting the highest fixed charge T(j;k).  The resultant Nash equilibrium input price for the combined
input package is:





                                               
20  We present specific results only for centralized partial integration. A sketch of the calculations is presented in the
Appendix. The same conclusions apply to either of the divisional forms of partial integration.  Further details are20
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As we might expect, the input price falls from the price v* = 1/2 when g = 0, in which case
the downstream market is effectively perfectly competitive, to v* = 0 when g = ¥, in which case
each downstream firm is effectively a monopolist. It turns out, however, that these price changes
are exactly offsetting. That is, the equilibrium prices (21) and (22) generate an aggregate profit of
1 = P
a  no matter the degree of product differentiation in the downstream market.
21 The ability of
the upstream consortium to apply a two-part tariff insulates them from the effects of product
differentiation and allows the consortium to extend its monopoly power into the downstream
market.
7.  COMPARISON OF UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM MARKET STRUCTURES
There are important but far from obvious differences in prices and profitability among the
three different methods of transacting business between the upstream suppliers and their
downstream customers.  We summarize the main elements of this comparison in Table 2 and
illustrate the profit comparisons in Figure 8.
Consider first the impact of different vertical relationships on prices.  Compared to the
decentralized benchmark, coordination of pricing decisions either among the upstream suppliers or
between upstream suppliers and downstream producers generally benefits consumers via lower
downstream prices.  However, whether downstream prices are lower under the upstream network
or under partial vertical integration depends as well upon how the integrated firms are internally
organized.  When the upstream divisions are established as divisional profit centers, the input prices
they charge lead to product prices in the downstream market that are higher than the prices set by
downstream firms when they buy from an upstream network of suppliers.  Under other forms of
vertical integration, the lower input costs of the integrated firms intensify downstream competition
and yield downstream prices that are, on average, lower than under an upstream network of
supplier alliances.  Finally, only when the degree of product differentiation downstream is “large
                                                                                                                                                         
available from the authors on request.
21 If the upstream consortium did not apply two-part pricing it would set an upstream price for the combined input of
v* = 1/2.21
enough” is the upstream consortium better for consumers than decentralized markets, the network
of alliances, or the divisional profit center.  When the products marketed downstream are not too
differentiated, the upstream consortium’s ability to exploit its monopoly power leads to higher
downstream prices.
Comparisons of profits under different vertical relationships shed some light on the varied
relationships that we might actually observe in different sectors.  Consider first the profitability of
the downstream firms.  Because their profits are always greater with an upstream network of
supplier alliances than with decentralization, we should expect downstream firms to support any
effort to create or to facilitate the formation of such a network of alliances so long as it falls short
of a full consortium.   Not all of the downstream firms fare equally well under partial vertical
integration.  Because a non-integrated downstream firm is adversely affected by having to compete
with a low-cost integrated rival, a non-integrated firm has incentive to block the backward
integration of its rivals.
Turning to the profits of the upstream suppliers, clearly the upstream consortium, which
confers upon them the greatest monopoly power, is the most profitable.  It may however be the
most difficult to implement.  If it cannot be established, then we are more likely to observe
upstream firms seeking to integrate vertically, particularly when such integration leads to the
formation of divisional profit centers since this internal organization generates the greatest
upstream profits.   Somewhat more surprisingly, upstream suppliers do not always do well in a
network of alliances.  Specifically, if the degree of downstream differentiation is relatively low, or if
g < 0.55, then the upstream suppliers’ profits are higher in the decentralized benchmark case.   The
upstream suppliers compete indirectly through the price competition of their clients in the
downstream market.  What the network of alliances does is to increase the degree to which the
upstream and downstream markets are connected.  This benefits the upstream suppliers at
reasonably high levels of downstream product differentiation by reducing the profit dissipation
effects of coordination failures.  But it harms the upstream firms at low levels of downstream
product differentiation by increasing the extent to which the upstream firms are directly subject to
competitive forces downstream in setting their prices.
In order to compare the profits of the integrated firms with the corresponding profits under














* * P + P 2 , that is with the combined profits of one downstream and two
upstream firms in either case.  Given our discussion of the relative profitability of different forms of
vertical integration, it should not be surprising to find that here again divisional form “matters”.
With either centralized integration or the group profit center, there is a trade off between
the profit-increasing effect of removing, at least partially, pecuniary externalities and double
marginalization, and the profit-reducing effect of making the upstream suppliers more directly
subject to competitive pressures in the downstream market.  When g is “low” and downstream price
competition is toughest the decentralized benchmark gives the greatest overall profitability.  For
intermediate values of g the greatest overall profit is obtained under a network of upstream
alliances.  Only for g “high” is it the case that the two internal forms of integration offer greater
overall profitability than the network of upstream alliances.
A different picture emerges however when vertical integration establishes upstream
divisional profit centers.  In this case, partial vertical integration gives the greatest profit for “low”
values of g, whereas the network of upstream alliances does better for “high” values.  The
decentralized benchmark is now never the most profitable arrangement.  The reasoning behind this
ranking has already been discussed.  This form of vertical integration reintroduces the efficiency
losses of complementary pricing but also gives the upstream divisions the ability to soften
downstream competition.  The competitive effect dominates the efficiency loss so long as the
downstream market is not too highly differentiated.
(Table 2 and Figure 8 near here)
8.   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It is well known that market transactions between upstream suppliers of specialized or
differentiated services and their downstream customers are affected by two types of market failure:
lack of price coordination between upstream suppliers of complementary inputs and double
marginalization.  These market failures are greatest in a fully decentralized market setting as a result
of which a move to coordinate pricing between upstream and downstream markets generally
benefits consumers through lower downstream prices.
What has emerged from our analysis, however, is that improved upstream/downstream co-
ordination will not necessarily result in increased profits for either the downstream firms or the23
upstream suppliers.  On the one hand, improved coordination at least partially corrects market
failure but on the other it exposes the upstream firms much more directly to downstream
competition.  To illustrate, we have shown that the profits of downstream firms increase when their
complementary upstream suppliers form a network of alliances, but such alliances increase the
profits of the upstream suppliers only if the degree of product differentiation downstream is
sufficiently large.
Similar forces are at work in understanding the profit impact of partial vertical integration.
Moreover, we have seen that whether integrated firms are more profitable depends not only upon
the degree of product differentiation in the downstream market, but also upon the organizational
form that integration takes.  When the integrated firm is organized with the goal of maximizing the
firm’s aggregate profit, partial vertical integration is more profitable provided that there is a
“sufficient” degree of downstream product differentiation.  By contrast, if the upstream division of
an integrated firm is established as a divisional profit center, partial vertical integration is more
profitable provided that the degree of product differentiation is “low”.  And whatever the form of
integration, the integrated firms do not find it in their interest to force the exit of their non-
integrated rivals.
This raises a number of important strategic issues to which we hope to return in subsequent
analysis. It is tempting to believe that partial vertical integration, or its non-linear pricing
interpretation, will always be attractive provided that the integrating firms can be flexible with
respect to the internal structure they adopt.  What is not clear is first, whether competing integrated
firms will adopt the same internal structure and second, whether firms will be driven to integrate
even though this could lead to profit reducing downstream competition.
The final important lesson that we draw from our analysis is that the way in which upstream
firms supply their specialized inputs to downstream firms will be characterized by a considerable
degree of diversity across different industries.  This occurs because the relative profitability of
different relationships between the upstream and downstream sectors depends in a non-trivial and
not necessarily obvious way upon the nature and strength of competition in the downstream
market.  The recent attention in the business press on the project-based approach to supply
relationships is suggestive of a trend toward flexible specialization upstream and a move away from24
complete vertical integration. This paper suggests why this trend might be expected to strengthen in
some sectors while being resisted in others.25
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX.
1. A Generalization
Assume the basic model presented in the body of the paper with the generalization that that
demand in the downstream market for product (j; k) is q(j;k)(p), where p = (p(1;1¢), p(1;2¢), p(2;1¢), p(2;2¢)).
Define  [ ] ) 2 , 2 ( ) , ( ) 1 , 2 ( ) , ( ) 2 , 1 ( ) , ( ) 1 , 1 ( ) , ( ) ; ( , , , ) ( ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ = ￿ p q p q p q p q q k j k j k j k j k j p  and assume that
( ) . 0 ) ; ( < ￿ p k j q  Then profit to downstream firm (j; k) is:
(A.1) ( ) ( ) p ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( k j k j k j k j q v v p - - = p .
The price reaction function for firm (j;k) is:
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The comparative statics of the solution to these reaction functions are then:
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   (j,m = 1,2; k,n = 1¢, 2¢)
The denominator is negative so long as second order conditions are satisfied.  The numerator is
also negative provided that demand for product (j; k) is a decreasing function of its own and the
other product prices. We can, therefore, expect the price reaction functions to be upward sloping.
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(u ˛ {1, 2, 1¢, 2¢})
Any arrangement upstream that reduces the prices charged to the downstream firms will result in
lower downstream prices.
Solving the downstream reaction functions gives the downstream prices p(v) and gives
upstream demand for inputs j and k as a function of the upstream prices.  We can then investigate
the maximizing problem for an upstream firm in the first-stage price game. The profit function for
an upstream firm j, for example, is:








k j j j q v v p (j = 1, 2)
with similar profit equations for a firm k.  We can then compare the decentralized case with the
upstream alliance.  To do so, first define  ( ) [ ] u u u u u v p v p v p v p D ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ = ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ) 2 ; 2 ( ) 1 ; 2 ( ) 2 ; 1 ( ) 1 ; 1 ( , , , v p
for u ˛ {1, 2, 1¢, 2¢}.27
1.1 The Decentralized Case
The upstream price reaction function for upstream firm j is:
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and similarly for the upstream firms k.
1.1 The Network Case
Now the profit function for an upstream firm j is:
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This gives the upstream price reaction function:
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Similar profit and reaction functions hold for upstream firms k. Comparison with the decentralized
case confirms that (A.6) is negative at the solution for the decentralized case.  In other words, the
network alliance always leads to lower input prices than the decentralized case and so to lower final
product prices.
No similar general comparison is possible for partial vertical integration since such an
arrangement is likely to have asymmetric effects on integrated and non-integrated downstream
firms.
2. The Linear Demand Case
2.1 Downstream prices for decentralized markets or an upstream network alliance:
The downstream prices are the solutions to the following problem:
22
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22  These and all other calculations were performed using Mathematica.  Details are available from the authors on request.28
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2.2 Upstream prices for the decentralized case:
The reaction functions corresponding to the stage one game played in input prices are then:
(A.9a) ( ) ( )( )
( ) 3 18 16 2
2 7 8 3 4
2
2 1
+ g + g
- + + g g - + g
=
¢ ¢ * v v v
v
h d
i (i, h = 1,2; i „ h)
(A.9b) ( ) ( )( )
( ) 3 18 16 2
2 7 8 3 4
2
2 1
+ g + g







i (i, h = 1,2; i „ h)








j v v .
2.3 Upstream prices for the network alliance
The reaction functions corresponding to the stage one game for the network alliance are:
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2.4 Partial Vertical Integration
The downstream prices are the solutions to the following:
(A.11a) ( )( ) { } ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( max arg i i i i i i i i v p q p ¢ ¢ ¢
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2.4.1 Centralized integration
With centralized partial vertical integration we know that v(i;i¢) = 0. The reaction functions
corresponding to the stage one pricing game are then:
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where the positive coefficients are:
A(g) = 756g + 3328g
2 + 4608g
3 + 2048g
4; B(g) = 81 +372g + 544g
2 + 256g
3;
C(g) = 144 + 696g + 1056g
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2.4.2 A divisional upstream profit center
When the upstream division aims to maximize its own divisional profits we have the
upstream reaction functions:
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2.4.3 An upstream profit center maximizing group profits
When the upstream division is established as a profit center concerned with the aggregate
profits of the integrated firm the upstream reaction functions are:
(A.15a) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) g
g + g + + g + +
=
¢ ¢ ¢ *
¢ J
H G v v F v v v
v
i i h h h h
i i
) ; (
) ; ( (i, h = 1,2; i „ h)
(A.15b)
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=
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h i h h h i i
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(A.15c)
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=
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h i h h h i i
i
) ; ( ) ; ( (i, h = 1,2; i „ h)30
where the positive coefficients are:
( ) ( ) g + = g 12 9 F ;  ( )
3 2 256 512 336 72 g + g + g + = g G ;  ( )
2 96 84 g + g = g H ;
( ) ( )
4 3 2 256 640 56 210 27 8 g + g + g + g + = g J ;  ( )
3 2 256 512 336 72 g + g + g + = g K ;
( )
3 2 256 544 372 81 g + g + g + = g L ;  ( )
3 2 512 1056 696 144 g + g + g + = g M ;
( )
4 3 2 2048 4608 3320 756 g + g + g + g = g N ; ( )
4 3 2 2048 5120 4416 1512 g + g + g + g = g O ;
( ) ( )
4 3 2 512 1280 1108 384 45 8 g + g + g + g + = g P .
2.5 The upstream consortium
The problem facing the downstream firms is to choose prices to solve:
(A.16) ( )( ) { } v p q p k j k j k j - =
*










p k j (j = 1, 2, k = 1¢, 2¢).
The upstream consortium chooses v to maximize aggregate profit of the upstream and
downstream firms.  This is:
(A.18) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 8 3
1 4 3 1 4 3 4
,
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Maximizing this with respect to v gives:
(A.19) ( ). 4 3 2 3 * g + = v
2.6 Vertical Foreclosure
We provided the analysis for the centralized partial vertical integration case. Assume that
integrated firm [1;1¢] forecloses on downstream firm (1;2¢) while integrated firm [2;2¢] either
remains willing to supply both downstream firms or also forecloses on firm (1;2¢).  In either case,
firm (1;2¢) is forced to exit the market,  The downstream demand functions become:
(A.20) ( ) ( ) p p p q k j k j k j -
g
- - = ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; (
1
1 p    (j;k) ˛ {(1;1¢), (2;1¢), (2;2¢)},
where  ( ) ) 2 ; 2 ( ) 1 ; 2 ( ) 1 ; 1 ( 3
1
¢ ¢ ¢ + + = p p p p .
As above, the downstream prices satisfy:
(A.21) ( ) { } ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ; ( max arg i i i i i i p q p ¢ ¢
*
¢ ¢ = p (i = 1,2)31
(A.22) ( )( ) { } 1 2 ) 1 ; 2 ( ) 1 ; 2 ( ) 1 ; 2 ( max arg ¢ ¢ ¢
*
¢ - - = v v p q p p .
The solutions are:
(A.23a) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) g + g +
+ g + + g + g
=
¢ *
¢ 6 2 6 5
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(A.23b) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
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=
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Substituting these prices into the profit functions for firms [1;1¢] and [2;2¢], which are:
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deriving the reaction functions for v2 and v1¢ and solving gives the input prices to firm 21:




1 2 36 48 13 27 27 4
18 24 7 6 5 3
g + g + g + g +




* v v .
Substituting (A.25) into (A.23) and (A.24) gives the profits to the upstream firms with this partial
foreclosure.
Symmetry implies that the same solution applies if either or both integrated firms foreclose
on firm (2;1¢) but not (1;2¢).  Finally, foreclosure by the integrated firms on different downstream
firms is equivalent to their foreclosing on both downstream firms.  This gives the pay-off matrix for
the integrated firms of Table 2. Straightforward but tedious analysis confirms that for any value of g
> 0 the only Nash equilibrium for this game is “no foreclosure” by either integrated firm.
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Figure 1: The Basic Market Structure
Figure 2: Decentralized Profits
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(a) Alliances for Firm 1 (b) Alliances for Firm 1¢
Figure 3: Network of Upstream Alliances
Figure 4: Network Alliance Profits
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Figure 5: Partial Vertical Integration
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(a) Integrated Firms
(b) Non-Integrated Firms
Figure 6: Downstream Prices with Partial Vertical Integration36


























Figure 7: Profits with Partial Vertical Integration37
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Figure 8: Profit Comparisons38
Table 1: Pay-Off Matrix for Partially Vertically Integrated Firms
Firm 22
no foreclosure foreclose 12 foreclose 21 foreclose both
no foreclosure nf nf
















foreclose 21 pf pf
22 11,P P
ff ff














2 4 3 2
5 4 3 2
3071 7296 5840 1758 153
13312 44672 56560 32998 8547 747 8 7 8
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Table 2: Comparison of Prices and Profits
1.  Prices
         Upstream n p d v v v
* * * > >
         Downstream Centralized partial vertical integration





n d p p p p
* * * * > > >    for g < 0.275





d p p p p
* * * * > > >    for 0.275 < g
Divisional profit center




ij p p p p
* * * * > > >    for g < 0.264





d p p p p
* * * * > > >    for 0.264 < g
Group profit center





d p p p p
* * * * > > >
2.  Profits




* * p > p    for g < 0.551





* * p > p    for 0.551 < g






, * * * p > p > p
















































































* * * p > p > p    for 0.369 < g.
Notes: 
1 Combined profit is the sum of profits of one downstream and two
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